Russia and Iran’s ‘unprecedented’ military ties worried the US, but it’s starting to look like Russia can’t hold up its end of the deal

• Iran has supported Russia by providing it with arms to use in Ukraine.
• That has worried the US, which sees it as part of a growing Russian-Iranian defense partnership.
• But there are signs that Moscow may not deliver on the agreements it has made with Tehran.

Less than a year ago, the White House was warning of “unprecedented” military ties between Russia and Iran, but today, there are signs of increasing friction, with Moscow proving to be an unreliable partner.

Late last year, as Russia risked depleting its missile stockpiles after months of fighting in Ukraine, Iran agreed to supply Moscow with arms, mostly Shahed-136 one-way attack drones, which Russia has used in attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

In December, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Iran and Russia were forging “a full-scale defense partnership” that would threaten the Middle East and the wider world. Kirby said “support is flowing both ways,” with Moscow providing Tehran “an unprecedented level of military and technical support.”

As part of this burgeoning partnership, Iran expected to receive an unspecified number of Russian Su-35 jets, along with helicopters and even advanced S-400 air-defense systems. Yet there is no indication Iran has received any equipment or will receive any of it the foreseeable future.

Analysts expected Iran would receive at least 24 Su-35s — aircraft Russia built for Egypt as part of an order that was later canceled — in the near future, but in recent statements, Iranian officials have gone from expressing optimism that the first jets would arrive in a matter of months, if not weeks, to making comments that suggest they are unsure if the jets will arrive in the coming years.

In a damning report published on July 13, Tehran-based journalist Saeed Azimi cited one current and one former Iranian diplomat who, under condition of anonymity, told him that Iran “fully paid” for 50 Su-35s during the second term of former President Hassan Rouhani, who left office in August 2021.

While the figure of 50 Su-35s had not been disclosed prior to Azimi’s article, it fits with Iran’s longstanding estimate that it needs 64 new fighters to modernize its aging fleet, which is mostly composed of US-made jets acquired before the 1979 revolution.

Moscow promised delivery of the Su-35s by 2023, which the diplomats quoted by Azimi doubt will happen. “Iranian officials feel embarrassment over Russia’s failure to adhere to commitments,” Azimi wrote.

As if to add insult to injury, in July, Moscow backed a joint statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council that supported the United Arab Emirates’ claim over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three small but important islands in the Persian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has controlled the islands since 1971, seizing them after the British left the region. The UAE, formed the same year, has claimed them ever since.

Iran summoned Russia’s ambassador and asked Moscow to “correct its position,” which Tehran no doubt views as unacceptable interference in its internal affairs.

By supporting the GCC statement, Russia is demonstrating how it still aims to balance relations with Iran and the Arab Gulf states, despite its ostensible strategic partnership with the former. Moscow has important economic ties with those Arab states that have only grown since its attacked Ukraine last year.

Interestingly, in response to Russia’s move, Iranian state-run media played down their partnership, saying it was merely tactical and that Moscow is not a strategic ally.

The head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, Richard Moore, said this week that Iran was seeking cash by selling arms to Russia, which seems to bolster earlier reports that Tehran sold Moscow drone technology for $900 million, paid in US dollars, and suggests the Iranians seek a transactional relationship with the Russians rather than a strategic defense partnership.

While Iran has never armed Russia to the extent it has in recent months, Moscow has sold Tehran considerable military hardware in the past. After the Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988, the Soviet Union gave Tehran a “blank check” to buy any conventional armaments it wanted.

At the time, the Soviets were offering 72 MiG-29 and 24 MiG-31 fighters and 36 Su-24MK tactical bomber. However, Tehran was strapped for cash after the eight-year war with its neighbor and could only afford a smaller number of MiG-29s and Su-24MKs, as well as S-200 air-defense systems. Moscow delivered the aircraft in 1990 and 1991.

Those sales were recently described as “the most important acquisition of military technology by the Islamic Republic until now and perhaps even as of now.”

Russian arms sales to Iran have continued but haven’t reached the level of that briefly amicable period, when Moscow and Tehran weren’t even allies and had no formal alliance or partnership like they purportedly do today.

Russia sold Iran only six relatively low-tech Su-25 attack planes in the 2000s. In 2007, Iran signed an $800 million contract for Russian S-300 air-defense systems, but Moscow refused to deliver them for almost a decade, only transferring them in 2016.

The UN arms embargo on Iran officially expired in October 2020, leaving no international restrictions that Russia could use as a pretext for refusing to deliver weapons for which Iran has reportedly already paid.

With their partnership looking more and more one-sided, Iranians may ask what they are getting militarily or politically from aiding Russia. Moore and his US counterpart, CIA director William Burns, say there are already signs of that.

“Iran’s decision to supply Russia with the suicide drones that mete out random destruction to Ukraine’s cities has provoked internal quarrels at the highest level of the regime in Tehran,” Moore said on Wednesday.

The US has also seen signs, Burns said Thursday, that “Iranian leadership has hesitated about supplying ballistic missiles to the Russians, which was also on their wish list as well, partly because they’re concerned not just about our reaction but about European reaction as well.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.