A daring Ukrainian military push into Russia’s Kursk region has seen Kyiv’s forces seize scores of villages, take hundreds of prisoners and force the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians in what has become the largest attack on the country since World War II.
In more than a week of fighting, Russian troops are still struggling to drive out the invaders.
Why the Russian military seems to have been caught so unprepared:
Russia’s regions of Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod share a 1,160-kilometer (720-mile) border with Ukraine. That includes a 245-kilometer (152-mile) section in the Kursk region. This frontier had only symbolic protection before Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022. It’s been reinforced since then with checkpoints on key roads and field fortifications in places, but building solid defenses has remained a daunting task.
The most capable Russian units are fighting in eastern Ukraine, where they have been pressing offensives in several sectors, with incremental but steady gains. Moscow has used the regions to launch airstrikes and missile attacks on Ukrainian territory but doesn’t have enough land forces there.
Because of the porous border and manpower shortages, there have been earlier forays into the Belgorod and Bryansk by shadowy groups of pro-Kyiv commandos fighting alongside Ukrainian forces before they pulled back.
Russia’s drones, surveillance equipment and intelligence assets are focused in eastern Ukraine, helping Kyiv to covertly pull its troops to the border under the cover of deep forests.
Retired Gen. Andrei Gurulev, a member of the lower house of Russia’s parliament, criticized the military for failing to protect the border.
“Regrettably, the group of forces protecting the border didn’t have its own intelligence assets,” he said on a channel of his messaging app. “No one likes to see the truth in reports, everybody just wants to hear that all is good.”
Ukrainian troops participating in the incursion reportedly were told their mission only a day before it began. That secrecy contrasted sharply with last year’s counteroffensive, when Kyiv openly declared its main goal of cutting the land corridor to Crimea, which President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed in 2014. That military action failed as Ukrainian troops trudged through Russian minefields and were pummeled by artillery and drones.
Ukrainian troops faced no such obstacles entering the Kursk region.
Battle-hardened mechanized units easily overwhelmed lightly armed Russian border guards and small infantry units consisting of inexperienced conscripts. Hundreds were taken prisoner, Ukrainian officials said. The Ukrainians drove deep into the region in several directions, facing little resistance and sowing chaos and panic.
The operation resembled Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive in which its forces reclaimed control of the northeastern Kharkiv region after taking advantage of of Russian manpower shortages and a lack of field fortifications.
Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, who led the Kharkiv operation two years ago, is now Ukraine’s top military officer. Russian forces in Kursk answer to Gen. Alexander Lapin, who commanded Moscow’s forces in Kharkiv in 2022 and was criticized for that debacle. But his ties to the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, reportedly helped him survive and even get a promotion.
Syrskyi claims Ukrainian forces advanced across 1,000 square kilometers (390 square miles) of the Kursk region, although it’s not possible to independently verify what exactly Ukrainian forces effectively control.
“Thus far, the Russians have demonstrated tactical and operational shock, which has led to a slow tactical response and has allowed the Ukrainians to continue exploiting their breakthrough of the Russian defensive lines,” said retired Australian Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan in an analysis.
The Russian military command initially relied on warplanes and helicopters to try to stop the onslaught. At least one Russian helicopter gunship was shot down and another was damaged.
At the same time, Moscow began pulling in reinforcements, which managed to slow Ukraine’s advances but failed to completely block Ukrainian maneuvering through vast forests.
“Russia seems to do quite poorly when it has to respond dynamically in a situation like this,” said military analyst Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment in a podcast. “Russian forces do far better when they’re operating with prepared defense, fixed lines, more on positional warfare.”
Kofman noted the Russian reserves arriving in the Kursk area seemed to lack combat experience and had trouble coordinating with each other.
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